

MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
WEEKLY  
INFORMATION BULLETIN



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
G-5 DIVISION  
USFET

REPORTS AND INFORMATION BRANCH



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# CONTENTS

	PAGE
HIGHLIGHTS OF POLICY . . . . .	3
The Task Ahead . . . . .	3
What the Germans Will Eat This Winter . . . . .	4
You Are Making History — Today . . . . .	7
The Role of UNRRA in the DP Operation . . . . .	9
Public Safety in the US Zone . . . . .	12
GENERAL . . . . .	16
MG Regulations to Appear in One Volume . . . . .	16
Plans Made to Alleviate Fuel Shortage . . . . .	17
ICD Cultural Programs . . . . .	17
Population Figures — US Zone . . . . .	18
GERMAN REACTIONS . . . . .	25
Denunciation and Cooperation . . . . .	25
Denazification Hearings . . . . .	26
Attitudes: A Recent Sampling . . . . .	26
Why They Cooperate . . . . .	27
LESSONS FROM OPERATIONS . . . . .	28
PRESS COMMENTS . . . . .	30
Peace Spotlights Occupation Problems . . . . .	30
Random Comments . . . . .	32
QUERIES . . . . .	34
PERSONAL DATA . . . . .	35

# The Task Ahead

BY LT. GEN. LUCIUS D. CLAY

Deputy Military Governor

MILITARY government has entered a new phase. The initial period of planning, organization, and the restoration of law and order are behind us. From now on, military government will be judged by its longer range results.

Our objectives and policies are established. In JCS 1067, our Government has prescribed its immediate program for the occupation. Based on this, the Directive of 7 July 1945 lays down the pattern for military government in the US Zone. Now these policies have been largely confirmed by the agreements of the Tripartite Meetings at Potsdam. Marking the transition to this new stage, General Eisenhower issued his message of 6 August to the German people, setting out our plans for the occupation.

We enter this new phase better organized than ever before for the job ahead. The two Districts and the Military Government Detachments are now fully set up with their separate chain of command for military government purposes. The Theater Staff and the US Group Control Council are working together on a closely integrated basis. The Control Council has begun to function, and will doubtless soon start to establish common policies and a limited number of central German agencies.

From the experience to date, we know many of the problems and ob-

stacles we face in carrying out our policies. Most of these problems are inherent in the nature of the task assigned us. We must make sure that we do not create unnecessary difficulties for ourselves through failure to cooperate fully in solving our real problems.

For the present, the occupation of Germany is the task of the military forces. Technical channels have been authorized for military government and should be freely used, but we must rely ultimately on command channels to insure that the job is done. Above all, the spirit of teamwork must animate our entire military government staff. Cooperation must be the keystone at all levels in the occupying forces.

With definite objectives and an effective organization, we must now concentrate our energies on attaining the underlying purposes of the occupation. We must never forget that the war was fought not only to defeat Germany, but to establish permanent peace. Germany has been defeated, but the final success or failure of the war depends in large measure on whether our military government achieves the basic aims of the occupation.

As we face the day-to-day problems and difficulties, we must never lose

sight of these basic purposes or of their vital importance for the future. The price of failure is so high that we must leave undone nothing likely to aid in

attaining our aims. If we constantly strive to meet that test, we have the opportunity to contribute greatly to the future peace of the world.

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## What the Germans Will Eat This Winter

THE GERMANS will eat this winter. The pertinent questions are whether what they eat from available supplies will be enough, whether it will be the right sort of food.

Under present conditions, with normal food movements between regions virtually stopped, and with reliance on indigenous resources plus the necessity of feeding displaced persons, refugees, and disarmed German soldiers, the answer is no. The current ration scales for normal consumers under these conditions in the US Zone provide caloric values which vary among the regions from approximately 1,100 to 1,300 calories per person per day. It is estimated that an additional 200 to 300 calories per person per day are obtained from unrationed foods such as fruits and vegetables. These ration allowances are considerably below the maximum of 1,550 calories per person per day for normal consumers established last January by SHAEF directive as a temporary scale during the period of military operations.

Supplemental rations are provided for certain categories of consumers, such as heavy workers and pregnant and nursing mothers. Except in the case of miners, however, the supplemental

rations are still below the levels considered adequate for these categories. Due to the critical urgency of coal production, supplemental rations up to 3,600 calories have been authorized if necessary for surface workers and up to 4,000 calories for underground workers.

Even with the addition of unrationed items, such as fruits and vegetables, and supplemental rations for special categories, current German food consumption is well below the 2,000 calorie average level for the non-farm population regarded as the bare minimum for a limited period. The highest ration levels for Germans during the war, in July 1940, provided approximately 2,400 calories for normal consumers. The lowest, in May 1945, allowed about 1,530.

Calories are a convenient means of measuring food consumption, but this measure is sometimes misleading and susceptible of misuse. A calorie is the unit of energy required to raise one ounce of water one degree in temperature centigrade. Germans could get all of their caloric energy requirements from bread, or sugar, or butter alone, if they could eat that much, and if it were available, but they would be

deficient in other nutritional requirements, such as proteins, vitamins, and minerals.

A typical current ration in the US Zone as compared with a minimum ration supplying adequate quantities of essential food nutrients at the 2,000 calorie level allows only 53 per cent of the required bread, 62 per cent of potatoes, 61 per cent of meat, 27 per cent of sugar, and 71 per cent of fats. The difference in calories between the two rations might be made up by additional bread, but the total diet would still be deficient in essential nutrients.

### DIET OVERBALANCED

Of particular importance are the so-called protective foods, milk, meat, fats, vegetables, fruit, as distinguished from energy foods, bread and potatoes. The German war diet has been overbalanced by bulky energy goods, and deficient in high-grade proteins and minerals. To offset this, vitamin pills were distributed among mothers, children, workers, and soldiers, and margarine was enriched with vitamins. Despite these additions to the diet, in the summer of 1943 carbuncles and other skin troubles were observed, and in the winter of 1943 an epidemic of influenza swept Germany. The causes of this were assumed to be largely the shortage of certain nutrients, in particular the lack of vitamins.

If this could occur under the relatively adequate ration levels prevailing at that time, the potential dangers under current ration scales are all too apparent.

Under the provisions of the SHAEF directive of 25 January outlining policies for the control of distribution and

rationing of food in Germany, no imported food is to be issued to the German population except in extreme emergencies in areas where indigenous supplies are not available in sufficient quantities. It was made clear to the Germans that they were to rely on their own production of indigenous resources for their livelihood. So far issues of imported food to German civilians have been authorized only in the Ruhr (40,000 tons of grain) in the Saar (10,400 tons of grain) and in Berlin. These issues have been for the purpose of maintaining, not increasing, current ration scales, and for providing supplemental rations for miners.

Germany never achieved self-sufficiency in food production, in spite of the vaunted and ruthless attempts of the Nazis to do so. They used to import about 15 per cent of their food requirements. In 1936 Germany as a whole imported 4,725,000 metric tons of food stuffs in which she is deficient, and exported only 100,000 tons. The total imports included substantial amounts of grain, meat, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, and other commodities.

### LESS SELF-SUFFICIENT

The region which is now the US Zone was even less self-sufficient than all of Germany, falling about 25 per cent short of meeting its food requirements from its own production. In 1936 its total imports amounted to almost half of those for all of Germany, while it exported about 300,000 tons. Its imports included almost as much grain as the total for Germany, more potatoes than the total for Germany, and substantial amounts of meat, fats, sugar,

fruits and vegetables and other commodities.

## MUST HAVE IMPORTS

It is possible that Germany as an economic unit, with production up to normal, with production and distribution controls intact, and with adequate transportation could, on a stringently reduced ration scale, subsist for a limited time without imports. This would require normal food movements from the East into the West and South. Since none of these required conditions exist at present, the several regions will have sizeable deficits for nearly all commodities in relation to even a minimum subsistence ration.

Preliminary crop estimates for the 1945 harvest in the US Zone indicate a production of bread grains this year approximately equal to that of last year, though less than the 1939-44 average. The current rainy spell is causing the grains that are not yet housed to sprout, which will result in considerable loss. The outlook for potatoes is for a production slightly less than in 1944, and preliminary reports for sugar beets and oil seeds indicate that both acreage and yield per acre will be considerably less than in 1944. Preliminary reports also indicate a decrease in livestock numbers, particularly for hogs, from a corresponding period in 1944. This should mean a slightly increased supply of direct consumption energy foods, but a corresponding decrease in supply of meat and fats.

How much of this crop is actually available to the Germans for consumption depends on several factors, among them collections from the farms, pro-

cessing facilities, transportation, efficiency of distribution controls, and amounts that may be required for feeding displaced persons, refugees, and disarmed German soldiers. Due to current difficulties in all of these factors, it is unlikely that the harvest by itself will make possible an increase in current ration scales in the near future. Movement of bread grains to mill is normally slow, because the grain must harden first, and because it is the practice to thresh throughout the year.

## ADDITIONAL COMPLICATION

An additional complication in the food picture for the Germans this winter is the growing black market. Under the extremely low current ration scales consumers are virtually forced into black or "grey" market dealings in order to subsist. This has meant a growing commerce in food products outside of legal channels, and means that those who can afford it and those with farm contacts may be getting enough to eat while others are far from it. From a nutritional standpoint this means the available food is not being distributed in accordance with needs.

All of these factors taken together add up to a dangerously lean winter. With the normally surplus-producing Eastern region no longer surplus, and with the former movement of foods from that area into other areas not only closed off, but actually reversed in part by the arrangement to ship food to Berlin for the several national sectors from the corresponding occupation zones, the normal deficits in the Western regions cannot be alleviated from former sources. It is likely, therefore, that Western Germany will be subject to the threat of serious nu-



tritional and health difficulties, and possible disorder in urban centers, arising out of a grave shortage of food.

We can say they should have thought of that before they started the war and let them starve or survive as best they may. That might be all right if we were not trying to maintain law and order in the country and convince the people that democracy is the best way to live. It is difficult to govern, much less persuade to your views, a hungry people.

Or we can do what we are doing about it which is trying to aid in every way the Germans' own food production and distribution program. This is being done by assigning highest priority to coal, transportation and other facilities for food processing, including use of army transportation where necessary, by planning marketing and distribution

quotas, by planning for seed, fertilizer, and other production facilities, by supervising reestablishment of rationing and distribution controls, including suppression of black market dealings.

In addition, recognizing that with all that may be done to secure maximum production and utilization of the indigenous crop there will still be a substantial deficit in food requirements for a minimum adequate diet, request has already been made for arrangements to import a quarter of the estimated 1945-46 year's deficit of grain. This was done in view of the approaching critical condition within the next few months. So far only grain has been requested for import, although deficits of other commodities may exist, and as pointed out above, a balanced ration is as important as one with adequate caloric values.

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## You Are Making History — Today

THE SCALE of Military Government operations in Germany today is virtually without precedent in military annals. Every phase of the life of over 15,000,000 Germans is today under the control and direction of the US Army. The Military Government detachments which are the instruments of that control and direction are making history every day.

Today's history contains the seeds of tomorrow's policies and operations. War Department and Theater directives which make mandatory the historical coverage of Military Government operations in the US Zone are based on the realization that past experience

is the foundation for future action. Many of the plans and policies which today regulate Military Government were developed after study of the Hunt Report, which is the history of the American occupation in Germany after World War I.

Had the Hunt Report not been written, the experiences of that occupation could not have been applied to present-day operations. The lessons of history are applicable to the molding of the future only when that history is documented and recorded.

Thus, the history that is being made today must be similarly recorded to

serve as a guide for the future, to provide for more complete understanding of the multiplicity of problems entailed in imposing Military Government upon an enemy nation.

It is the individual detachments operating in the field that are actively making history. Their experiences must be collected and integrated in order to create a picture of greater scope and dimension which will encompass the entire field of Military Government operations.

The Theater Historian feels that only officers trained in the Military Government field are fully competent to cover the major elements of the history of Military Government in Germany. It has therefore been decided that the Historical Section, G-5 Division, USFET, will be responsible for the collection of all historical material of Military Government activities and for the preparation of the history of the Military Government phases of the occupation of Germany which is required by the War Department.

In order to insure a complete record of the development of Military Government in Germany, provision has been made for the thorough historical coverage of Military Government activities in the American Zone of Germany.

### A FULL-TIME EFFORT

It is planned that trained G-5 Historical officers will devote their full-time efforts to the writing of the history of Military Government operations at the Military District Headquarters and Regional Military Government levels. These historians will be charged with responsibility for the review, preservation, collection, and

maintenance of key documents reflecting major policies determined and recommended by Military Government staff, with the recording of all Military Government policies and operations as they develop, and with the evaluation of all data of historical importance relating to Military Government within the area of their jurisdiction.

The value of the history they write will depend, to a large extent, on the individual detachments whose history they record. If history is to fulfill its purpose, it must be built on truth, truth in the form of documentary evidence and tangible fact. The history of American Military Government in Germany must be based upon the evidence of its actual operations, and therefore the Military Government historian must rely on the detachments in the field as his source of information, documents, and records.

### ONE FOR EACH TEAM

Each detachment should have an officer as its historian. His function is to make available to the responsible Regional historian all data relating to the operational activities of the detachment, to policies established, to difficulties and problems encountered, and to results achieved. The Regional historian will advise and assist the detachment in the maintenance of these records and in the collection and preservation of all valuable information.

The history that is currently being made must be told, must be recorded with the completeness and thoroughness it deserves. It can be so recorded only when all concerned fully appre-

ciate its purpose and its value. Complete cooperation between the Regional historian and the Military Government detachment in the field will insure the

validity, the comprehensiveness, and the future applicability and significance of the history of Military Government in the US Zone.

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## The Role of UNRRA in the DP Operation

ALMOST 6,000 persons from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration will shortly be at work in Germany, caring for the 1,600,000 United Nations Displaced Persons who still remain. The story of this international operation, whose objective is the best possible care for the forced laborers and political and racial victims of Nazism, began in November, 1944, when an agreement was signed by General Eisenhower and Director General Herbert H. Lehman of UNRRA. The Supreme Commander gave UNRRA the particular assignment of providing personnel who would assist in the administration of DP assembly centers and transient points. Working under military supervision, UNRRA personnel were organized in teams or served as members of combined military-UNRRA detachments. A total of about 3,500 UNRRA team and specialist personnel are now deployed in DP operations in Germany. An additional 2,300 will receive assignments shortly.

In formulating the original agreement, both General Eisenhower and UNRRA looked forward to broader responsibilities for UNRRA in the post-military period. The agreement stated: "It is the intention of the Supreme Commander, AEF, that UNRRA person-

nel shall replace military personnel to the maximum extent and as soon as possible in the handling of displaced persons and refugees, subject to the requirements of the military situation." (Section 2, Appendix C, SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39, Revised).

This policy will be implemented by new agreements now being negotiated, which will extend UNRRA's responsibilities throughout the DP program. Subject to the authority of the US, UK, and French Zone Commanders, and proceeding under military control, UNRRA will assume full responsibility for the assembly centers, replacing all military personnel now engaged in their administration. At staff levels, UNRRA will relieve military officers in so far as possible in zone and district DP assignments. The agreement for the US Zone will probably go into effect on October 1, 1945, with agreements for the British and the French Zones expected to follow soon after.

The forthcoming change reflects the changing character of DP operations. Earlier this year, the displaced persons program concentrated all facilities and resources on mass repatriation movements accomplished at high speed. Now we are entering a period which

will have as a primary feature the care and welfare of DPs whose movement out of Germany cannot be immediately completed.

#### FOUR MILLION REPATRIATED

In four months from April through July, more than 4,000,000 displaced persons were repatriated. This accomplishment, largely the work of military personnel, is the more remarkable since it was achieved under the conditions of the German collapse when facilities and organization were severely handicapped. With rapid large-scale movement as the first objective, extended welfare service in the centers had necessarily to take a secondary place.

As of August 14, about 1,600,000 United Nations Displaced Persons remained in the centers. Their repatriation is being expedited wherever possible, and by October the total should be considerably reduced. Nevertheless, according to current surveys, the DPs now in the centers are to large extent people whose movement from Germany will be delayed for varying lengths of time, from a few weeks to several months. In addition, there are several hundred thousand persons who are permanent non-repatriables; the exact number is still in doubt.

UNRRA thus approaches its new responsibility at a time when the assembly centers must engage in longer-term services for the DP population. UNRRA will have as an immediate task the development and execution of extended programs for food and clothing, housing, medical care, family and children's services,

work, recreation, and religious and educational services within the centers.

In the forthcoming period of greater responsibility, UNRRA will furnish the military authorities with periodic estimates of the supply needs for the DP operation. However, the procurement and distribution of essential supplies — food, clothing, medical supplies, physical facilities and equipment — now a military responsibility, will continue to be so. Up to now, the DP operation has drawn its supplies largely from requisitioned German stocks. In all likelihood, this source will continue to furnish the bulk of DP essentials, whether under UNRRA or the military procurement. "Amenity supplies," comprising such materials as tobacco and candy, sewing materials, supplies for welfare work and recreation, come exclusively within UNRRA's sphere and have already been imported in part from abroad; it is anticipated that distribution of these supplies to centers will begin shortly.

#### MILITARY KEEPS TRANSPORTATION

While it is planned that UNRRA will have a consultative voice in matters relating to repatriation, the military authorities will remain in charge of the transportation. Similarly, they will retain responsibility for the security of the DP population, furnishing guards and security troops for the assembly centers and military liaison officers for UNRRA at staff levels.

UNRRA's organizational structure for DP operations follows the general lines of the military organization for the zones of occupation. A Central UNRRA Headquarters, temporarily located at Höchst, near Frankfurt, operates as coordinating authority for

operations in the three military zones. In the US, UK, and French Zones, UNRRA maintains a Zone Headquarters exercising executive powers under the Central Headquarters. The military pattern is repeated in the UNRRA District Headquarters, which correspond to the two army areas of the US Zone and the three corps areas of the British Zone. The District Headquarters, through a number of field supervisors, will administer the assembly center teams. There are now 302 UNRRA teams deployed in the field — 117 in the US Zone, 150 in the British Zone, 20 in the French Zone of Germany and 15 in Austria.

### FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE

When UNRRA enters upon full responsibility for the assembly centers, it will have a thoroughgoing background of first-hand experience in DP operations. In recent weeks an increasing number of UNRRA teams have been given full charge of the centers where they are assigned. They are familiar with all the detailed working arrangements which must be made to run smoothly for the efficient operation of the centers. UNRRA teams are also being brought up in strength. Until recently, most teams were "spearhead" units of six to eight members. This number was smaller than originally planned for the teams, but was adopted to meet the demand for more teams when the flood of mass repatriation was at its height. Wherever possible, the teams are being raised to the full complement of twelve to fifteen persons, including additional medical personnel and welfare workers. A full-strength team comprises a Director, one or more Administrative Officers, Clerk-

Stenographer, Supply Officer, Steward (Messing Officer), Warehousing Officer, Welfare Officer, Assistant Welfare Officer, Medical Officer, Nurse, and two Driver-Mechanics.

### MEDICAL PROGRAM DIFFICULT

UNRRA's goal in medical work is to deploy a doctor and nurse to approximately every 2,000 displaced persons. This is an ambitious program, with many difficulties to overcome, but every effort is being put forward to realize it. At present, many hospital staffs are composed of doctors and nurses of various nationalities, working under the supervision of an UNRRA doctor. If this arrangement can be maintained, it will facilitate the extension of the health program in the centers, where military and UNRRA medical personnel have already given outstanding service in checking contagious disease, notably typhus, and in restoring the health of malnutrition victims.

In addition to its assembly center activities, UNRRA is expanding its record and information services and will ultimately take over the records sections now operated by the DP Units of G-5 and Military Government. One of the most important needs of the displaced persons is that of locating missing relatives. Also, persons outside of Germany are attempting frantically to learn the fate of relatives sent into Germany by the Nazis. To handle this situation, UNRRA has established a Central Tracing Bureau, which by cooperation with the various zones has already been responsible for bringing many families together.

With the eyes of the world on the displaced persons problem, it was inevitable that numerous organizations

should volunteer their services to aid in caring for DPs. In order that the work of all of these agencies — their personnel and supplies — may be used to the best effect, UNRRA is coordinating and supervising all of the voluntary welfare agencies. These include the

Red Cross, National Catholic Welfare Conference, American Friends Service Committee, American Joint Distribution Committee, and other agencies. UNRRA is empowered to make agreements and arrangements with these agencies and expedite their work in the field.

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## Public Safety in the US Zone

WHILE many public safety problems still remain for future solution, a review of accomplishments in this field to date show that there has been continuous progress in all branches. This progress has been made possible by the hard work and individual resourcefulness of public safety officers in our Military Government detachments who are successfully overcoming the many obstacles which confront them.

From the beginning of occupation, the inter-relationship of the German police system with the NSDAP and affiliated organizations made denazification and reorganization of local police agencies a difficult problem of first priority. In nearly all cases the only Germans available to replace Nazi police were old men, many of them retired for many years, whose value as policemen rested more on their personal reputation within the community than on their ability as police officers.

Following the combat phase, it became possible to screen larger groups with greater care. Police schools were placed in operation shortly after Aachen fell to the Allies. These early schools

furnished police cards for many of the departments and formed the framework upon which reorganization rested. They also provided the experience which is of such vital importance in planning long-term training programs.

The problems of arms and uniforms were also difficult ones to solve. The armbands bearing identification "M. G. Polizei" were not impressive to a populace accustomed to well-uniformed public servants. Such identification on civilian clothing also lowered the morale of those Germans who had indicated a desire to cooperate with Military Government by serving as police officers. Wehrmacht uniforms stripped of their Nazi insignia were too representative of the past and, in many instances, they were resented by American soldiers.

Under existing policies each separate Police Department designs and adopts its own distinctive uniform, subject to approval by Military Government officers, as long as it bears no resemblance to the Nazi or military uniforms of the Hitler period. However, the shortage of appropriate cloth has delayed the uniforming of police. This problem is being rapidly overcome and many of the

police department now appear in smart and distinctive uniforms, resulting in a marked increase in the morale and efficiency of the police officers. Firearms and other weapons, except night sticks, were also prohibited under original policy but it was soon found that night sticks were poor symbols of authority to a nation accustomed to daggers for dress and all types of arms for execution.

It also placed German police officers in the unfavorable, if not impossible, situation of enforcing the law and protecting life and property without adequate weapons, while being confronted by persons with criminal intent who were nearly always armed. To eliminate this condition, several police departments have been rearmed after careful screening of personnel, and under present directives other departments will be rearmed when necessity for such action is indicated and approval is obtained from higher authority. Public safety officers find it somewhat ironical however to be in a situation where it is necessary to obtain 20,000 police revolvers from the US to rearm police, while thousands of suitable weapons in the ETO have disappeared into the hands of souvenir-hunters. Pending receipt of these revolvers, such weapons as carbines and rifles are being used. The issue of ammunition is strictly limited.

### CRIMES DECLINE

Crimes have dropped in number as the number of displaced persons has decreased. There has been no question but that liberated slave laborers considered it their right, after years of enforced labor, to turn against their oppressors. The overall improvement in the regulation of passes and the re-

gistration of the entire populace has been beneficial to police efficiency.

Despite the volume of work required in reorganizing the police and keeping crime at a minimum, the life of public safety officers might have been a much happier one were it not for three other subjects which directly concern them - namely, travel restrictions which required the issuance of thousands of passes, a denazification program to purge every institution in the US Zone, and Public Safety Reports.

### EXCEPTIONS NECESSARY

During the combat phase and during the early days of occupation, it was obviously necessary to place restrictions on the travel of Germans. But it was equally necessary to allow exceptions to such restrictions when travel was essential for economic or other reasons. Farming had to continue and supplies of all kinds had to be arranged for and transported from one community to another. Public Safety Officers had to scrutinize closely each request for travel to determine its necessity before authorizing a pass. Other complications arose when requests involved travel into other Zones. This problem has now been partially eliminated by directives to each Military District Commander granting him authority to eliminate travel restrictions within his district and, if desired, to agree mutually with the other District Commander for free inter-district travel. At the same time US Group CC began negotiations with our Allies for an agreement covering interzonal travel. When this is obtained all public safety officers will be promptly advised of the procedures involved.

When the assignment of responsibili-

ties for denazification was made by SHAEF, the CI Branch of G-2 was made responsible for the dissolution of all Nazi organizations and agencies, while the Public Safety Section of G-5 was given responsibility for eliminating Nazis from Government, trade, transportation, communications and all other industries. This led to the establishment of a Special Branch within each Public Safety section to handle this important assignment. The task quickly became complicated, for while it was believed the directives were clearly worded, our Public Safety officers soon found themselves in conflict with using and supervising military services. Each side had entirely different views relative to the interpretation to be placed on the two critical phrases "nominal Nazi" and "position of influence." It was argued that to carry out the letter of the directive would result in stopping transportation, communications and many other essential services in which highly skilled technical men hold key positions, with suitable replacements almost impossible to find. There is still no agreement on the subject, but at the Theater and US Group CC level every possible effort is being made to clear up the issues involved, so that the denazification program can proceed and at the same time not interfere with all essential services employing non-Nazi personnel, or at least with personnel not in the mandatory removal category.

## TWO MAJOR SUBJECTS

Public Safety Reports are required in order that the Theater Commander may have accurate and timely information on two subjects of great importance to him: the state of law and order in the US Zone, and the progress

being made in denazification. He is responsible to the United States Government for both and cannot carry out these responsibilities without being kept fully informed. Our Public Safety officers in the field, confronted as they are with many local problems pressing for solution, sometimes lose perspective and cannot see the need for these reports that are of such vital importance. This is particularly applicable to the monthly denazification report, the report of offenses known to police or Public Safety officers, and the arrest report. When these reports arrive promptly, a rapid consolidation quickly gives a Public Safety picture of the US Zone, upon the basis of which intelligent action can be taken.

## SEPERATE DEPARTMENTS

No consideration of Public Safety would be complete without inclusion of the fire departments. The policy is to completely separate the German fire service from the police service and to reorganize it on a basis decentralized even more than the police service. There will be no administrative or operational control above a Kreis level, although mutual-aid agreements between adjoining fire services will be permitted. This policy presents no particular problems in its implementation. However, unless it is made clear to all concerned, German fire services will desire to reestablish agencies at RB and Land/Province level. This must not be permitted.

Fire service personnel must be denazified as thoroughly as any other former police agency. The percentage of Nazis in the fire service has not been found to be as great as in other agencies, so the problem of replacement



of officers has not been too difficult. Also the extensive training of civilian personnel in incendiary bomb fire-fighting as defense against air raids provides a source of trained personnel for replacements.

It is not the objective of Military Government to establish a first-class highly efficient fire service in Germany, but only to insure that there is re-established a fire service which will prevent civilian fire losses from embarrassing our Military Government administration and / or to augment military fire protection of installations of military value to us. For this there is sufficient equipment, if redistributed according to present requirements. Accordingly, all Public Safety officers are insuring that fire equipment in their area is distributed to maximum advantage. When complete information

from the US Zone is available at Theater headquarters, necessity for a general redistribution of equipment may be indicated. Also to alleviate the critical shortage of fire hose, the possibility of manufacturing this item is being investigated.

At this time we have reached the end of our first year in dealing with Public Safety problems in an occupied enemy country, for it was in the closing days of August 1944 that Public Safety officers in Military Government Detachments with the First US Army took up their duties in the Stolberg area in Germany. While mistakes have been made, a review of the year shows steady and satisfactory progress. German Police and Fire Departments are functioning, law and order is being restored and the denazification program is being pushed to completion.

# MG Regulations to Appear in One Volume

A NEW single set of Military Government Regulations, which will be similar in form and in scope to the familiar US Army Regulations, is presently being edited for publication in the near future, it was announced recently by Brig. Gen. C. L. Adcock, AC of S, G-5, USFET. The new regulations, to be published by direction of the Theater Commander, will include all directives, orders and instructions referring to the administration of Military Government that have been issued by USFET, the US Group Control Council, and the Military District Headquarters. SHAEF and Army Group directives that are still in force will also appear under the same cover.

The new Regulations should be an invaluable aid to all Military Government personnel, especially those on detachment level, in the clarification of present policy and administrative instructions. When issued, it was announced, the Regulations will supersede all existing Military Government directives and instructions.

After the initial publication of the Regulations all subsequent directives on Military Government matters from USFET to lower echelons (except specific instructions on individual cases) will be issued as amendments to the Military Government Regulations. Moreover, no permanent instructions establishing or modifying basic policies will be issued without the approval of the Chief of Staff, USFET.

Only in unusual emergencies will temporary instructions, not establishing or modifying basic policies, be issued directly by cable or telephone, but in such case, a copy of the instructions will be immediately furnished for incorporation into the Military Government Regulations and for formal issuance.

A recent USFET letter to the Military Districts announced that a committee, consisting of three officers, had been established for the purpose of compiling and editing the Regulations and subsequent amendments. The officers were appointed by the AC of S, G-5 and the Adjutant General, Hq USFET, and by the Deputy Military Governor.

Initially, the Military Government Regulations will be divided into 23 major sections, which will include directives and operational instructions on the following subjects: General Provisions; Eradication of Nazism and Militarism; Political Activities; Civil Administration; Legal and Penal Administration; Public Health; Public Welfare; Education and Religious Affairs; Public Safety; Civilian Communications; Industry; Food and Agriculture; Trade and Commerce; Civilian Transportation; Manpower; Finance; Property Control; Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives; Reparations, Deliveries and Restitutions; Displaced Persons; Information Control; Military Government Reports; and Military Government Legislation.

## Plans Made to Alleviate Fuel Shortage

FORECASTING that the shortage of coal in the US Zone of occupation during the coming winter will be critical, Brig. Gen. C. L. Adcock, AC of S, G-5, USFET, gave the green light to the Military District Headquarters program for securing lumber and wood products for military and civilian heating, cooking and construction of necessary shelter from October to March, 1946.

It was stated, moreover, that plans must be made on the basis that only negligible amounts of coal will be available even for military purposes. "Unless immediate steps are taken," General Adcock said, "there will also be a critical shortage of essential shelter!"

Military District Commanders, in addition, were authorized to direct German authorities to take all possible steps to secure and ration wood products for necessary use by civilians. In connection with this, military commanders were directed to utilize any US equipment and supplies that are not required in essential military operations in order to aid the German civilians. Subject only to redeployment requirements, the essential maintenance of troops, harvesting and food processing, it was requested that military railway, road and water transportation be utilized to the maximum extent to supplement civilian transportation now available.

Germans not fully employed in agriculture, food processing, coal mining, transportation, public utilities and other essential occupations, will be made available for the lumber cutting program. Maximum use will also be made of all voluntary displaced persons

labor, while prisoners of war will provide wood for military use.

## ICD Cultural Program

NOW that the emergency stage of occupation has been completed, Information Control Division has begun to put into practice its German cultural and information program.

Some local difficulties have been reported by the District Information Control Commands because certain detachments have refused authorization for public gatherings, thus preventing ICD-approved entertainments and symphonic concerts. Such public gatherings are of positive value to Military Government and deserve encouragement. It is possible that some interference has arisen due to misconstruction by Military Government Officers of the Public Safety directives.

The Public Safety Manual states that "permission may be granted to hold entertainments, sports meetings and similar events" (Paragraph 169), if a permit has been obtained in advance from the Military Government Public Safety Officer concerned.

Some Military Government officers seem to have been misled by paragraph 22 (5) b of the Security Intelligence Directive for Germany published by Headquarters 12th Army Group on 10 April 1945. Under the heading, "Civil Security Control," is the statement: "Gatherings of more than five persons for purpose of discussion will be prohibited by Military Government." This paragraph is intended to prevent public meetings or parades which might result in disturbances or public disorder because of unstable local conditions. Under normal circumstances, however, permission should be granted in advance by Public Safety Officers for public gatherings in connection with the DISCC cultural programs.

# Population Figures—US Zone

THE FIGURES presented below permit a comparison of official 1939 figures with estimated figures which have been obtained since the occupation (approximately 14 July 1945). Figures from the Eastern Military District are listed in three columns: 1939 figures; 1945 figures as of March, taken from ration statistics by German officials; and (incomplete) figures from ration statistics for July.

## WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT

### Hessen-Nassau

		1939	1945
KASSEL	SK	211,624	90,000
	LK	50,379	53,131
Wolfshagen	LK	27,084	59,140
Fulda	SK	31,645	32,775
	LK	69,963	70,000
Hanau	SK	40,260	13,241
	LK	58,884	79,873
Marburg	SK	26,764	34,170
	LK	65,435	105,750
Waldeck	LK	61,648	93,200
Hersfeld	LK	48,504	86,400
Hünfeld	LK	24,884	23,424
Melsungen	LK	33,997	45,898
Rotenburg	LK	41,863	46,195
Eschwege	LK	49,842	58,000
Frankenberg	LK	36,006	46,800
Fritzlar Homberg	LK	56,427	102,600
Witzenhausen	LK	37,262	48,725
Ziegenhain	LK	40,182	101,250
Hofgeismar	LK	40,665	61,695
WIESBADEN	SK	165,646	139,186
Gelnhausen	LK	54,051	65,000
Schlüchtern	LK	31,338	31,000
FRANKFURT	SK	548,220	290,438
Obertaunuskreis	LK	53,021	60,000
Usingen	LK	19,023	21,153
Rheingau	LK	40,697	40,006
Wetzlar	LK	90,931	91,000
Biedenkopf	LK	39,136	39,000
Dillkreis	LK	63,705	63,705
Limburg	LK	61,610	63,000
Main Taunuskreis	LK	71,235	87,000
Oberlahnkreis	LK	41,843	51,000
Untertaunus	LK	34,860	47,000
Total		2,368,634	2,340,755

# Hessen

		1939	1945
DARMSTADT	SK	110,552	59,728
	LK	59,052	57,635
Giessen	SK	42,948	35,913
	LK	69,114	74,420
Offenbach	SK	85,128	58,615
	LK	104,427	96,184
Bergstrasse	LK	97,105	95,901
Friedberg	LK	95,071	110,000
Groß Gerau	LK	78,604	69,921
Alsfeld	LK	43,819	44,153
Büdingen	LK	59,568	60,159
Dieburg	LK	65,865	64,074
Erbach	LK	49,132	49,768
Lauterbach	LK	33,712	34,000
Total		994,097	910,471

# Württemberg

		1939	1945
STUTTGART	SK	454,346	300,000
Heilbronn	SK	74,214	50,000
	LK	105,362	50,000
Ulm	SK	68,585	50,000
	LK	52,842	76,000
Esslingen	LK	106,110	130,000
Ludwigsburg	LK	133,189	123,000
Aalen	LK	84,480	102,000
Böblingen	LK	93,452	120,000
Göppingen	LK	119,264	137,000
Künzelsau	LK	21,683	25,000
Mergentheim	LK	30,422	37,000
Nürtingen	LK	73,336	90,000
Waiblingen	LK	100,257	124,000
Bachnang	LK	53,579	64,000
Craßsheim	LK	49,340	70,000
Gmünd	LK	59,359	87,000
Hall	LK	42,146	65,000
Heidenheim	LK	62,281	74,000
Leonberg	LK	45,034	47,000
Öhringen	LK	30,207	36,000
Vaihingen	LK	46,330	51,000
Total		2,014,517	1,908,000

# Baden

		1939	1945
KARLSRUHE	SK	184,489 )	674,100
	LK	106,437 )	estimated
Pforzheim	SK	78,320 )	1 Jan 1945
	LK	43,073 )	

		1939	1945
Bruchsal	LK	89,572	—
Mannheim	SK	280,365	175,000
	LK	102,835	104,000
Heidelberg	SK	84,273	130,000
	LK	90,490	91,000
Buchen	LK	45,043	75,000
Mosbach	LK	39,775	60,000
Sinsheim	LK	52,395	55,000
Tauberbischofsheim	LK	56,140	56,650
Total		1,253,207	1,420,750

#### Bremen Enclave

		1939	1945
BREMEN	SK	424,137	280,000
	LK	25,947	29,301
Wesermarsch	LK	72,975	82,850
Wesermünde	SK	112,831	75,000
	LK	49,917	49,419
Osterholz	LK	42,550	41,526
Total		728,357	558,096

#### EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT BAYERN

		1939	4 March 1945	22 July 1945
OBERBAYERN				
Aichach	LK	29,730	36,118	—
Altötting	LK	49,062	64,367	69,829
Bad Aibling	LK	29,901	36,788	—
Bad Tölz	LK	25,381	35,685	42,461
Berchtesgaden	LK	36,650	48,245	27,077
Dachau	LK	40,585	79,560	47,009
Ebersberg	LK	30,652	39,935	—
Erding	LK	48,286	56,583	64,494
Freising	LK	53,279	65,652	—
Friedburg	LK	23,341	26,455	—
Fürstenfeldbruck	LK	42,807	47,758	60,667
Garmisch-Partenkirchen	LK	36,353	49,504	63,300
Ingolstadt	SK	31,370	34,683	—
	LK	31,633	34,311	—
Landesberg	LK	36,512	44,979	48,849
Laufen	LK	37,991	46,382	—
Miesbach	LK	47,145	68,548	—
Mühlendorf	LK	43,469	51,815	52,813
München	SK	815,212	559,104	494,179
	LK	61,859	58,572	59,619
Pfaffenhofen a. d. Ilm	LK	39,079	43,000	—
Rosenheim	SK	20,692	22,002	23,012
	LK	54,835	77,871	97,691
Schongau	LK	24,670	30,249	37,503

		1939	4 March 1945	22 July 1945
Schrobenhausen	LK	22,616	25,229	—
Starnberg	LK	34,790	46,234	—
Traunstein	LK	62,503	85,365	108,078
Wasserburg a. Inn	LK	39,151	48,054	61,750
Weilheim	LK	43,959	56,551	—
Wolftratshausen	LK	23,116	34,935	35,442

Total	1,916,360	1,932,163
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# NIEDERBAYERN & OBERPFALZ

Amberg	SK	28,864	29,651	44,138
	LK	32,762	34,671	—
Beilngries	LK	13,836	16,615	—
Bogen	LK	31,386	32,923	—
Burglengenfeld	LK	41,113	46,126	—
Cham	LK	30,911	34,279	—
Deggendorf	LK	53,959	58,441	—
Dingolfing	LK	24,487	29,953	36,641
Eggenfelden	LK	41,296	44,984	70,479
Eschenbach i. d. Opf.	LK	24,991	26,589	—
Grafenau	LK	22,964	23,906	33,904
Griesbach	LK	32,252	39,888	—
Kelheim	LK	37,059	41,174	51,331
Kemnath	LK	16,413	17,546	—
Kötzting	LK	28,602	28,488	—
Landau a. d. Isar	LK	25,169	28,171	37,477
Landshut	SK	32,762	33,919	—
	LK	27,321	30,476	—
Mainburg	LK	18,306	20,643	—
Mallersdorf	LK	24,852	27,778	—
Nabburg	LK	20,338	23,389	—
Neumarkt i. d. Opf.	LK	37,662	45,107	—
Neunburg vorm Wald	LK	14,907	15,993	—
Neustadt a. d. Waldnaab	LK	39,218	52,111	47,525
Oberviechtach	LK	13,694	14,434	—
Parsberg	LK	31,683	32,090	—
Passau	SK	24,430	25,690	—
	LK	44,094	49,903	86,576
Pfarrkirchen	LK	41,406	64,578	—
Regen	LK	35,126	35,852	—
Regensburg	SK	90,651	98,719	102,555
	LK	62,854	66,182	—
Riedenburg	LK	14,906	16,214	—
Roding	LK	25,512	26,988	32,997
Rottenburg	LK	19,008	20,575	—
Straubing	SK	27,775	27,856	33,586
	LK	23,443	27,685	—
Sulzbach-Rosenberg	LK	22,251	25,175	—
Tirschenreuth	LK	44,303	45,202	—
Viechtach	LK	26,554	27,191	—
Vielsbiburg	LK	31,734	35,078	47,113
Vilshofen	LK	46,354	51,217	—
Vohenstrauß	LK	23,167	22,921	—

		1939	4 March 1945	22 July 1945
Waldmünchen	LK	14,960	24,271	19,612
Wegscheid	LK	18,736	19,436	—
Weiden	SK	27,864	30,748	—
Wolfstein	LK	34,034	34,448	—
	Total	1,444,880	1,605,274	
OBERFRANKEN & MITTELFRANKEN				
Ansbach	SK	24,025	30,666	29,865
	LK	36,688	45,755	49,135
Bamberg	SK	55,854	56,216	63,323
	LK	58,831	63,434	—
Bayreuth	SK	42,898	46,780	—
	LK	35,114	38,949	—
Coburg	SK	29,934	30,036	—
	LK	52,393	58,469	—
Dinkelsbühl	LK	27,650	36,298	—
Ebermannstadt	LK	21,846	23,243	—
Eichstätt	LK	33,299	36,136	—
Erlangen	SK	33,471	37,438	—
	LK	15,073	19,161	—
Feuchtwangen	LK	26,346	32,250	—
Forchheim	LK	41,397	44,228	—
Fürth	SK	78,838	68,103	78,147
	LK	34,756	42,620	41,452
Gunzenhausen	LK	31,003	40,615	42,748
Hersbruck	LK	23,308	36,183	—
Hilpoltstein	LK	23,926	28,798	—
Höchstädt a. d. Aisch	LK	29,409	32,482	—
Hof i. Bay.	SK	44,077	45,380	—
	LK	26,350	27,827	—
Kronach	LK	61,503	71,781	—
Kulmbach	LK	42,910	47,183	—
Lauf	LK	31,400	40,263	—
Lichtenfels	LK	39,940	45,062	—
Münchberg	LK	32,624	32,739	41,424
Naila	LK	28,452	28,043	—
Neustadt a. d. Aisch	LK	29,646	36,637	—
Nürnberg	SK	420,349	277,224	212,847
	LK	29,288	35,510	—
Pegnitz	LK	27,299	31,305	—
Rehau	LK	33,851	33,876	—
Rothenburg ob der Tauber	LK	26,734	33,503	—
Scheinfeld	LK	17,042	22,410	—
Schwabach	LK	50,434	59,985	63,386
Stadtsteinach	LK	16,234	16,437	—
Staffelstein	LK	19,182	21,493	—
Uffenheim	LK	31,589	40,810	—
Weidenburg in Bay.	LK	36,324	45,556	47,747
Wunsiedel	LK	55,742	57,336	—
	Total	1,857,060	1,898,220	



MAINFRANKEN		1939	4 March 1945	22 July 1945
Alzenau	LK	32,994	34,622	—
Aschaffenburg	SK	42,916	40,194	—
	LK	44,712	43,558	52,218
Brückenau	LK	13,854	20,379	—
Ebern	LK	19,225	24,396	—
Gemünden	LK	16,106	20,020	—
Gerolzhofen	LK	31,450	38,834	43,722
Hammelburg	LK	19,148	23,259	23,610
Habfurt	LK	31,927	37,903	—
Hofheim	LK	15,288	20,431	—
Karlstadt	LK	31,158	37,409	—
Kissingen	LK	41,211	48,710	—
Kitzengen	LK	41,977	49,824	—
Könighofen i. Grabfeld	LK	14,547	18,825	—
Lohr	LK	24,691	29,553	—
Markttheidenfeld	LK	30,191	35,730	—
Miltenberg	LK	24,868	33,211	32,618
Neustadt a. d. Saale	LK	23,602	30,727	—
Obernburg	LK	36,170	43,690	47,623
Ochpenfurt	LK	28,683	34,026	—
Schweinfurt	SK	47,223	28,610	37,378
	LK	45,567	44,402	—
Würzburg	SK	101,345	100,329	43,353
	LK	49,325	48,172	—
Mellrichstadt	LK	14,275	24,166	—
Total		822,453	910,980	
SCHWABEN				
Augsburg	SK	180,039	118,596	138,738
	LK	52,376	60,255	—
Dillingen a. d. Donau	LK	45,377	53,363	—
Donauwörth	LK	38,858	46,083	—
Füssen	LK	24,216	30,838	40,511
Günzburg	LK	38,789	45,402	—
Illertissen	LK	24,015	28,863	30,643
Kaufbeuren	LK	35,554	43,536	56,869
Kempten	SK	28,054	29,083	—
	LK	38,422	42,107	—
Krumbach	LK	24,298	29,887	—
Markt Oberdorf	LK	24,933	29,327	—
Memmingen	LK	51,045	59,068	62,881
Mindelheim	LK	37,806	47,398	—
Neubourg a. d. Donau	LK	40,579	46,712	63,726
Neu-Ulm	LK	38,885	45,691	40,875
Nordlingen	LK	37,210	45,229	—
Schwabmünchen	LK	27,377	28,467	—
Sonthofen	LK	49,650	65,707	—
Wertingen	LK	22,318	26,976	—
Total		859,791	949,043	
Grand Total Bayern		6,900,544	7,295,680	*7,070,973

\*Based on sampling.

# Recapitulation Population Figures - US Zone

	1939	1945
HESSEN-NASSAU	2,368,634	2,340,755
HESSEN	994,097	910,471
WUERTEMBERG	2,014,517	1,908,000
BADEN	1,253,207	1,420,750
BAYERN	6,900,544	7,295,680
BREMEN ENCLAVE	728,357	558,096
	<hr/>	<hr/>
BERLIN	14,259,356	14,433,752
		800,000
		<hr/>
	Total	15,233,752

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# Denunciation and Cooperation

RECENTLY in these columns attention was called to the timidity of anti-Nazis in making use of the new right of free speech to volunteer straight-forward information to Military Government and thus aid the latter materially in efficiently cleaning house on the Nazis. A hold-over fear complex from the Gestapo era, and a fear based on the reality of extant Nazi influence which could, in some localities, still impose some degree of ostracism, were given as causes. A third deterrent, according to a serious public servant who has a record of sincere cooperation with Military Government, stems from more worthy moral bases and should be given consideration. It is, in short, the disagreeable moral stigma at present attached to "denouncing" or "informing." This official's brief analysis of the matter is paraphrased below:

Many Military Government detachments are overwhelmed by a flood of denunciations professing to have been offered with the sole motive of aiding it ferret out unwanted Nazis. Too often, however, perhaps in the majority of cases, the motives of the informer are neither pure nor sincere, but cheap, or even vicious. His information is based on the principle of prejudice rather than service, on axe-grinding, advantage-seeking; in other words his recommendations (of self or friends) are just as suspect as his denunciations. A very mediocre civil employee may denounce

people senior to him in the hope that he himself will get an undeserved promotion, if for no other reason than because Military Government can find no more efficient replacement. Other informers may be plain rogues and charlatans who are quick to take advantage of a confused situation. Still others are smart crooks who work subtly at a high level and are not easily unmasked. The machinations and temporary partial success of these groups are widely observed and undoubtedly duly exaggerated by the general public, and the would-be "good" informer shrinks from becoming associated in the public mind with a set of rascals.

In due time Military Government will have separated the wheat from the chaff, for it is truly difficult for a foreigner to recognize a smooth operator as crooked or unscrupulous. Unfortunately, the conscientious German, who recognizes the native breed immediately, does not take this into consideration in reacting to Military Government policies; he sees and talks merely of the number of incompetent or unscrupulous people who have apparently found some degree of favor with it. And although otherwise sincerely wishing to cooperate in denazification and reconstruction, he does not want to associate himself with the type of informers and denouncers above-mentioned. The result is the decided reluctance, now quite prevalent,

of many essentially decent people, to furnish Military Government freely and fearlessly with timely and pertinent information on unacceptable Nazis or acceptable non-Nazis or nominal Nazis.

It is obvious that these people forfeit any right to complain about the selection of civil servants by Military Government, as the "unjust" removal of some and the "unjust" retention or acceptance of others. But all of them, of course, indulge in the pastime, while only a few realize the facts, and only a very few of the latter probably feel an interest or obligation strong enough to tell their reluctant compatriots that to their own lack of courage falls a good share of the blame.

The author of the above analysis emphasizes that the basis of the situation is the natural phenomenon that in times of social or political upheaval the dregs of a settled society always come to the top for a while; the situation should, he admits, right itself in time. Recalling the tremendous tonnage of dregs that rose to the top during the Nazi upheaval, one might question whether there would now be any dregs left. And from where should they rise since the Nazi dregs had remained on top of the politico-social structure until V-E day?

Returning to the problem of inadequate cooperation, our civilian commentator is not sure that there is any way of immediately improving the situation. His only suggestion is that Military Government might accomplish the conversion to frank and sincere cooperation of the more honest, public-minded citizens by using newspapers as media for publicizing to the Germans the situation just described, underlining

the fact that the responsibility for what is and what could be rests essentially with them.

## Denazification Hearings

THE administrator mentioned above also sets forth some interesting views on the problem of sifting the "nominal Nazis." He knows the difficulty Military Government is having in finding adequate replacements and states that the situation will become even more serious if the further sifting is not carried through with the utmost care and fairness. While careful to say it is not in the province of any German to question any Military Government removal decision, which is definitely of course, being made from the point of view of US policy and interests — not German — he urges strongly that Military Government adopt some policy of giving the man the benefit of an individual "hearing" (VERFAHREN). He believes this would aid Military Government immeasurably in gaining the solid respect of the mass of decent citizens by setting an example which would help restore their belief in real justice.

## Attitudes: A Recent Sampling

A CROSS-SECTION of public opinion on a number of familiar topics obtained by a Military Government detachment in a northeastern Kreis of the US Zone is given below. Other detachments in other sections readily will be able to gauge the extent to which these opinions reflect prevalent attitudes in their sections. The universality of a number

of these opinions is the really significant feature.

The people are at a loss to understand why certain agricultural items were allowed to spoil rather than be distributed to the local populace.

The general attitude toward American troops is very friendly and the people go out of their way to impress Military Government with their enthusiasm and their desire to make the troops comfortable. This is most noticeable in the Kreise that border on the Russian Zone.

In a rural Kreis bordering on the English Zone, the attitude toward the British Military Government is very favorable.

The people are friendly to Western European DPs but those from Eastern Europe are viewed with apprehension. The attitude toward the Jews is very favorable and those who have returned are treated with consideration.

There is a lack of feeling of war guilt and responsibility for what the Nazis have done. Horror and atrocity stories are generally regarded as propaganda.

General sympathy is shown for persons who were "forced" to join the NSDAP and are now losing their jobs.

There is no particular sympathy for the Nazis but they are not generally hated. Any atrocities are not blamed on Hitler but on high NSDAP officials who, they feel, committed them or ordered them committed without his knowledge.

The Social Democrats, Centrists and

Communists are the three leading political groups or parties.

## Why They Co-operate

THE following quotation from a leaflet purportedly circulated by a joint-Communist committee in Hessen-Nassau in July (and reported by the regional detachment) gives us in plain language, the common denominator of cooperation: "No differences with the occupational authorities! We know that our suggestions often went beyond the orders of the occupational authorities. This does not mean, however, that we would not carry the orders through in good faith with Military Government. In order to assure our food supply we need help from the occupational authorities, especially regarding transportation. We know that Military Government is interested in an adequate food supply for the population. Military Government also wants the removal of Nazis from public offices. This is the common basis on which cooperation can be founded. Every anti-Fascist must remember, however, that he should not wait for orders; for everyone it is a matter of initiative and work. Plans should be worked out to activate large sections of the population and to obtain their cooperation. Therefore, for the time being, there is only one motto: 'Act, do not wait! No flight from responsibility, no more inactivity and complaining. It is our women and children who have to be saved from starvation and it is up to us to succeed.'"

## LESSONS FROM OPERATIONS

### BATTLE OF RUBBLE

APPROXIMATELY 8,000 men, women and children, which included just about every able-bodied civilian in Giessen, took a day off from their regular duties recently to undertake the gigantic task of clearing away the great piles of debris which line the streets of the city. The work, under the direct supervision of the city engineer, was sponsored by Detachment G-35 which deemed it the quickest way to alleviate a critical situation.

Every person who could use a shovel or a pick, carry buckets, pick up debris by hand, or push a cart was ordered by the Bürgermeister to report for work.

### CIVILIAN PURGE COMMITTEE

A COMMITTEE of 20 local German citizens has been formed in Bamberg to assist Detachment G-222 in the denazification of public offices and the organization of new administrative departments. The committee, which is representative of the different interests of the population, will serve in an advisory capacity.

### MUNICH RUBBLE

DESPITE the fact that 8,000 war prisoners are being used in Munich for the huge task of clearing the Bavarian capital's streets and sidewalks of rubble left by 50 Allied air attacks, public-works officers of Detachment E-201 declare that there are 4,900,000 cubic meters of debris still remaining.

Since May 15, it is estimated that a total of 60,000 cubic meters has been

removed, and at the present time, a daily average of 2,000 cubic meters is being carted away from the principal streets. In addition to the prisoners of war, 140 US Army trucks, nine Army cranes and 10 trucks of private German concerns are being utilized.

### BANNING OF CIVILIANS

TO MEET the situation resulting from overcrowding and destruction of dwellings, the Bürgermeister of Giessen banned the return of all residents who had moved into the country. Likewise, the Berlin Detachment did not mince words in instructing German civilians not to attempt to return to Berlin. Said the announcement. "All civilians are forbidden to come to Berlin. This is an order of the Military Government and applies to former residents and all others. If persons do come to Berlin, they will not be given food ration cards or a place to live. Do not attempt to come to Berlin."

### AID FOR WOUNDED

IN KASSEL, Detachment E-4 has granted permission for the transfer of 50,000 marks from the blocked bank account of NSKOV to the Landeshauptmann to pay for artificial limbs, glass eyes, crutches and other aids for German war-wounded required during the next five months.

### WEHRMACHT CARS FOR CIVILIANS

APPROXIMATELY 500 captured German army motor vehicles have been re-

leased by Detachment E—201 in Munich for distribution to German civilians to be utilized for essential civilian needs. The vehicles, it was announced, are sent out in convoys to various parts of the province to augment local motor transportation.

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### EXCHANGE OF REICHSMARKS

BANKS in the LK Fritzlar were ordered by Mil Gov to discontinue exchanging Allied Marks for Reichsmarks. This exchanging was done by American soldiers, presumably to convert looted or stolen German money into negotiable Allied currency.

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### CHURCH AIDING YOUTH ACTIVITIES

MARBURG church leaders are cooperating with Detachment G—39 education officers in the formation of a plan for youth activities. Catholic, Lutheran and other pastors and lay leaders, will suggest the part they can play in youth programs designed to interest juveniles and help wean them from Nazi principles and practices.

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### HOUSING PRIORITIES GIVEN

IN Giessen, a survey committee has been selected to inspect the city and report on the extent of damages, the possibility of repairs and the availability of living quarters. Following the survey, Detachment G—35 announced that priorities will be assigned by the committee for making repairs which afford the most good. The Military Government announcement stated that dwell-

ings requiring the least labor and materials will have first priority.

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### CONVERTING GERMAN UNIFORMS

IN GEMÜNDEN, Austria, a salvaging depot has been organized under the supervision of the Military Government Detachment to convert old German army uniforms into civilian clothing. Leather belts will be converted into harness, it was reported.

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### ALPHABETICAL CENSUS TAKING

DETACHMENT E-201 in Munich ordered all of the city's inhabitants to appear in alphabetical order to register in the city's first post-war census. The alphabetical system, it is expected, will afford the easiest manner in which to register the estimated 350,000 civilians living there.

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### IMPROVE MINERS' LOT

ALTHOUGH the work is under the direct supervision of the US Corps of Engineers, Military Government officers in Munich are paying careful attention to the plan of the Engineers to improve the conditions of the German mine workers. As coal production is rated the most important factor in the economic reconstruction of Bavaria, American authorities are attempting to improve living conditions and are seeking a reasonable balance between working hours and time for recreation. Shifts, it was announced, have been reduced to normal hours and special rations are allotted amounting to two or three times those permitted the miners under Göring's four-year plan.

# Peace Spotlights Occupation Problems

FOLLOWING swiftly on the Potsdam Conference and the Russian war declaration, the capitulation of Japan held the major place in the news and press comments of the week. Jubilation over Allied victory was tempered by the realization that maintenance of the peace won at so vast a cost in blood and treasure imposed on the Allies heavy responsibilities.

"We have already turned our backs upon the isolationism born of the last war and are today part of a world organization through which we become jointly responsible for everything that happens anywhere in the world", declared the New York Times in an editorial on August 16. "If we want to preserve our way of life in the face of a world trend to the contrary, we will have to work at peace to make peace work."

The Philadelphia Inquirer called upon the Allied people to dedicate themselves, now that the war is over, to maintain the peace, by guarding against international hatred and distrust and by repressing aggression wherever it threatens peace. From the Paris radio came a warning by Dana that the freedom of peoples must become something else than the right to kill each other periodically. "Our allies have now, not only all the possibilities, but also all the responsibilities," he said. "In the sober joy of victory, the entire world is watching them."

Surrender of Japan focussed attention on the problems of occupation.

Commentators pointed out that Japan and Germany present in many respects a similar problem. In a broadcast over WJZ, Ralph Heinzen, for example, said that if we are to reform Japan and Germany to our way of thinking, "we must convert millions of the youth of Japan and Germany to some thinking in terms of more peaceful lines."

The problem of the demoralization of Germany was stressed by a Manchester Guardian despatch from Berlin, which stated that "no small part of the heavy task of occupation now will be to save the world from contamination by German disease — disease both physical and moral."

### CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACIES

The London Times asserted that the state of Europe was a challenge to the democracies, "whose aspirations will be disappointed if the perpetuation of old animosities between nations is allowed to wreck the work of relief and healing and if the social order collapses in starvation and disease."

Writing from Munich, Victor Bernstein, PM correspondent, expressed the view that the end of the Pacific war will affect the way in which we are administering Germany. "For one thing," he said, "we are going to have to decide what to do with the German industrial machine, which we deliberately have helped put in partial running order to turn out material we could use against the Japanese."

The New York Sun warned that Germany still has a vast industrial machine,



and asserted that until this machine has been dismantled, "the decisions reached at Potsdam concerning Germany's industrial future will not become effective."

The New York Herald Tribune, in an editorial on 10 August, hailed the Russian war declaration as the first instance of the actual operation of the principles of the United Nations charter, which formally declared war "to be the great enemy of mankind." The Washington Post saw in the Moscow announcement, the supplier of "a new cement to the unity necessary for the herculean task of creating a peaceful world," while the New York Times welcomed the Russian declaration as "a triumph of Allied statesmanship which must be accepted as a happy augury for further collaboration in peace in Europe and the Far East." Another typical comment was that of the Lynchburg, Va. News, which said that if the entry of Soviet Russia into the war "serves to bring the east and west associated in a common cause into still closer accord, the political future will be bright."

### DISAGREES WITH IDEA

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, in an editorial reprinted 10 August in the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune, takes sharp issue with those who have been urging that German coal be used to rebuild German industries. "If the coal of Western Germany is used to maintain and reconstitute German industry, and there is evidence as well as talk of it, then our generosity will turn as bitter as alum to the tongue," the Post-Dispatch declared. "The immediate issue stands out crystal clear. German coal mines must be repaired of the effects of

neglect and sabotage as quickly as possible with German labor, and put to work the furnaces of the new Europe as it once fed the first that wasted it."

### RETARDING DUTCH RECOVERY

In an interview in the same issue of the Herald Tribune, Col. J. C. A. Faure, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Netherlands Military Administration, charged that Allied Military Governors in Germany were playing into the hands of the Germans when they prevented the Dutch, Belgians and the French from immediately reclaiming property stolen from them by the Nazis. "German looting and destruction," he said, "were part of a long range plan which was being helped along unconsciously by Military Governors. It certainly was designed to weaken the industrial recovery of all the countries bordering on Germany, while Germany was getting back on its feet," he asserted, adding that the whole economic recovery of Holland will be retarded if she has to wait too long to recover her stolen property.

While the repatriation of displaced persons from Germany continues to receive considerable attention from the press, current comment is not without its critical note. The London News-Chronicle, for example, on 1 August, pointed out that although millions of the survivors of the Nazi slave labor system have been freed, a large number still linger on, most of them housed in camps under Allied administration. "They have no homes to go to, and no discernable future," the editorial asserted. "They are safe from the terrors of the Nazi regime, but otherwise too little is being done to make their lives tolerable or even useful, or to plan their re-integration in a forward look-

ing Europe. What happens to them is the Allies' responsibility. On an imaginative, sympathetic and, above all, constructive attitude towards the future of these human derelicts our relations with liberated Europe largely depend."

## RETURN HITS SNAG

George Tucker, AP correspondent, discloses that the long-awaited return of more than 900,000 Poles has been complicated by Russian reluctance to permit their passage across Germany before repatriation of their own nationals and by the Soviet claim that all Poles living east of the Curzon line are Soviet citizens anyway. As Tucker sees it, the situation is further complicated by the unwillingness of at least 50% of the Poles in the American, British and French zones of Germany to return to their former homes without an agreement that they will not be questioned by the Russian security police on the march across Germany.

Unauthenticated stories that the Military Government was grooming Rev. Martin Niemöller for an important post in the American zone brought quick and hostile fire from U. S. editorial writers. Typical of this criticism was an editorial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch which declared that his installation would be a blunder, even though Niemöller was one of the few Germans who dared to defy Hitler. "His defiance was on one ground alone . . . Hitler's interference in Lutheran church matters," the editorial declared. "For the rest, he accepted the Nazi doctrines. Niemöller was one of the Nazi party's first members. After our long and costly war to crush Nazism,

it would be the height of irony to sponsor one of his admirers and followers. Niemöller's courage is undoubted, but it should not be allowed to blind us to his unfitness to help rule Germany."

Asserting that elements exist which make possible a third German bid for world conquest, Lord Vansittart, in the Atlantic Monthly, predicted that the Germans will not try again, "if we stay on the job this time. Though the spirit may be strong, the flesh will be weak, until it is atrophied by disease," he stated. "If we fail to do so, if we listen again to those who would throw in their hands and trust to the 'good Germans', we may again be sure of the consequences. The wherewithal abounds and destructive science has more than kept pace with it."

## Random Comments

"THE PAUCITY of German-speaking personnel is still one of the great handicaps faced by the American Administration. Doubtless it explains why no effort has been made in the American Zone to handle native press and radio facilities in a manner comparable to that of the Russians. The most formidable difficulty obstructing the American Military Government in Germany, however, is not the one represented by the language barrier. It is an all too familiar political and social illiteracy with respect to Europe." — "Atlantic Report", August Atlantic Monthly.

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"The great danger that confronts the German economy is that of inflation. In April of this year there were 60,000,000 RM in circulation in Ger-

many as against slightly more than 11,000,000,000 in 1939. The coverage for that money is gone and the huge amount of Reich funds is worthless. It will be a long hard pull to make order out of that financial chaos." — Arthur Gaeth, over MBS, 2 August.

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"Many Americans have nursed the hope that the Christian churches of Germany will become vital centers for the country's regeneration. The fact is that their wartime record does not justify that hope. They did not even have the courage to open their churches to the millions of foreign slave laborers toiling in Germany, most of whom were devout Christians anxious for the consolation of the Church." — Sigrid Schultz, August McCall's Magazine.

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"The victors did not decree the present disintegration; the Nazis left a state of chaos. It would be better for the Germans and us if some central authority, however shadowy, could have

assumed the responsibility of carrying out orders and acting as a channel, and therefore as a link — so far the missing link — for coordinating the authority of the four occupying powers." — Anne McCormick, in the New York Times.

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"Sergeant Alexander Enright, a 36 year-old Czech, who is in the investigative branch of the American Military Government, said today that a poll taken by a German agent for the AMG showed that at least 50% of the German people still took Hitler's part. 'If they find fault with him, it is only in the presence of others in order not to be denounced' the agent reported."

\*

"A Military Government Officer explained: 'There is a lot of coal. We want the Germans to dig it. A healthy German who isn't starving can dig a lot more coal than a sick German. Our purpose is to produce more coal, not fat Germans.' — Cpl Debs Myers, in Yank.

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## QUERIES

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### Political Parties

Q. Can Nazis or ex-Nazis engage in political parties?

A. The same principle should be applied to political parties as is applied to public office, quasi-public positions, and important positions in private enterprises.

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### General Eisenhower's Message

Q. In regard to General Eisenhower's Message to the German People, are there instructions which are supplementary to the Message?

A. Yes. The Administration of Military Government in Germany, July 1945 (as amended), which will be issued shortly.

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### Definition of Terms

Q. How is the term "local" to be defined, i. e. as Gemeinde, Kreis or Regierungsbezirk?

A. There has been no general, inclusive definition. In general, it would mean "not national," but in the case of trade unions, political activities, etc., the respective branches responsible therefor may determine at what levels such activity will be permitted. The term "local" includes Landkreis and Stadtkreis.

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### "National" Parties

Q. What parties with nationalistic "militaristic" background must be ex-

cluded? For example, a party using the term "national" as part of its title?

A. The term "national," descriptive of a political party, is not in itself objectionable.

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### Payment on Requisition

Q. How can a German civilian who holds an Army requisition procure payment promptly?

A. The German civilian should present his requisition receipt to the Bürgermeister of the place where he resides or does business for authentication and payment. The Bürgermeister can procure necessary funds for paying requisitions from the Reichsbank. If the civilian does not wish to wait for authentication and payment, which may take 30 days, he can borrow upon his requisition receipt from the local commercial banks upon such terms and conditions as he and the bank agree between themselves. Military Government officers are not involved in this kind of borrowing.

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### Correction

In the August 4 issue of the Bulletin an unfortunate error occurred in this section in the answer to the query on "Finance." Concerned with the blocking of the bank account of Heidelberg University, part of which is needed for the maintenance of the University, the latter part of the answer should have read:

"... Funds necessary to pay salaries of custodians for safeguarding and cleaning property, plus such sums as

may be needed to make the minimum essential repairs to preserve the property from deterioration due to weather, may be made out of the blocked funds of the University. Military Government Finance officers in the area in which the property is located (in co-ordination with the Property Control Officers, if the property has been taken into control by the latter) must first approve, in writing, the sums requested and authorize the unblocking of the bank account to the extent needed for the preservation, maintenance and safekeeping of the property.

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Funds of the University may NOT be unblocked for the payment of its administrative or educational staff."

## **War Damage Compensation**

**Q.** Are German authorities authorized to assess and allow credit of payment of war damage compensation.

**A.** No. German authorities are prohibited from making payment or allowing credit account benefits on taxes or any claims for war damage compensation in the absence of further instructions.

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## **PERSONAL DATA**

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### **Decorations**

#### **LEGION OF MERIT**

1st Lt Thomas L. Walsh, Det H2H2.

#### **BRONZE STAR**

Lt Col Daniel I. Glossbrenner, Hq, ECAD  
1st Lt Harold I. Naidoff, Det. 1-130

#### **PURPLE HEART**

1st Lt Sinclair Robinson, R & T Bn, ECAD  
1st Lt Morris J. Haber, Med Gp, ECAD

### **Returned to the States**

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Lt Col Russell P. Drake, G-5, USFET  
Lt Col John B. Faulkner, G-5, USFET  
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Maj James F. Haley, G-5, USFET  
Maj Frances J. McCabe, G-5, USFET  
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Maj Frank J. Morris, G-5, USFET  
Maj Hubert L. St Onge, G-5, USFET  
Maj Oliver D. Vanderbilt, G-5, USFET  
Maj George V. Van Fleet, Jr., G-5, USFET  
Capt Solbert J. Barsy, G-5, USFET  
Capt Henry P. Cecil, G-5, USFET  
Capt Herbert H. Cohn, G-5, USFET  
Capt Richard M. Dobson, G-5, USFET  
Capt Joseph Hadary, G-5, USFET  
1st Lt John S. Feary, G-5, USFET  
1st Lt Morris C. Lowenberg, G-5, USFET  
2nd Lt Winthrop M. Crane, III, G-5, USFET  
WOJG Leon M. Locasto, G-5, USFET  
T/4 Thomas O. Pinkerton, Det 1-153

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